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Introduction
Access to and use of the land surface is essential to a mining
operation. The law governing surface rights has evolved from
English and American precedents drawn from several fields.
* Professor of Law and Director, Energy Law Center, University of Utah. B.S. 1966,
University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1969, LL.M. 1973, University of Virginia.
** Candidate for J.D. degree, May 1986, University of Utah. B.A., B.S. 1983, Univer-
sity of Utah.
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY [VOL. 1:267
Most courts recognize as a general proposition that the miner's
claim to use the land for the mining operations will take prece-
dence over the surface owner's claim to keep the land undis-
turbed. However, an examination of the history of surface rights
doctrines shows that courts have sought to compel the miner to
operate with a degree of care for the land surface. In a variety
of factual situations and using a variety of legal theories, courts
have attempted to compel reasonable mining operations that are
attentive to surface values.
This article examines the factual and legal areas in which
surface rights law has developed over the past century in the
United States. Several hundred cases dealing with surface rights
law were considered.' In these cases, both the fact situations
giving rise to litigation and the legal theories that have arisen
out of the litigation are examined. It begins with an examination
of a half dozen English cases, the first decided in 1568 and the
last in 1840. These decisions form the backbone of the English
surface rights law that existed at the time that the first United
States cases on the subject appeared. Next, it examines key early
American surface access cases. These English and American
cases establish the background for surface rights law in this country.
The subsequent sections consider modern surface rights law,
including the factual situations that have given rise to most
surface access cases. The final section considers the contributions
of property, contract, tort and remedies law to contemporary
surface rights law.
I. THE ORIGINS OF SURFACE RIGHTS LAW
A. The English Cases
The origins of English surface rights law in mining date back
to the reign of Queen Elizabeth. The venerable case of The
Queen and The Earl of Northumberland,2 decided in 1568, ex-
amined the royal prerogative placing ownership of gold and
silver in the crown.' The issue before the court was how the
privilege was to be applied when gold and silver were mixed with
I We examined 351 United States cases considering surface rights issues. Cases
were selected from the Mines and Minerals keynote of the West Digest System. The
most pertinent key number was 55(6).
75 Eng. Rep. 472 (K.B. 1568).
Id.
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other minerals.4 In the course of resolving this issue the court
observed that the royal mining privilege was "with liberty to dig
and carry away the ores thereof, and with other such incidents
thereto as are necessary to be used for the getting of the ore." '
Nearly two centuries later the Court of King's Bench decided
the case of Wilkes v. Broadbent.6 While the facts are somewhat
vague, the dispute resembles many 20th century use and access
controversies. The plaintiff surface owners sued in trespass for
defendant's action in coming on their property to work on a
coal mine. 7 The defendant was charged with "breaking and
entering the plaintiff's close . . ., treading down the grass, sub-
verting the plaintiff's soil, and for laying wood, slate, and other
rubbish on the land .... -8 Defendant responded that his actions
were authorized by a manorial custom that allowed these work-
ings. 9
The court sustained the Court of Common Pleas' determi-
nation that the custom was unreasonable and void and gave
judgment for the surface owner. 0 The court held the asserted
custom was too broad and uncertain, and that it "laid such a
great burden upon the tenant's land, without any consideration
or advantage to him, as tended to destroy his estate, and defeat
him of the whole profits of his land, and savours much of
arbitrary power. . . ."" The court further suggested that the
"pits may be worked without this custom, for aught that appears
to the contrary." 12
In the 1806 case of Hodgson v. Field,3 the court's focus
moved from custom to contract. In 1747, the parties' predeces-
'Id.
Id. at 510 (the court supplied no citation for the proposition).
6 95 Eng. Rep. 494 (K.B. 1744).
, Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
,0 Id. at 495.
11 d.
Wilkes, 95 Eng. Rep. at 495.
103 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B. 1806). Stansfield deeded Marshall the right to build a
drain for his coal mining operation across Stansfield's property. The court does not
quote the exact language of the deed but the court's summary of it reflects a balancing
of the needs of the two landowners. Mine operator Marshall was given the right to
conduct the drainage system across Stansfield's land, to make some small pits to assist
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sors in interest entered into an agreement for the use of prop-
erty.' 4 After a period of operation, the mine was shut down and
the drainage system fell into disrepair." Half a century later the
mine operator's successor in interest wished to start mining
again. ,6 He entered the property and began preparing to reopen
the drainage system. 7 The surface Owner sued in trespass and
contended that the 1747 grant had allowed only a one-time access
to the property.
8
Lord Ellenborough construed the deed to allow continued
access to the landowner's property for the purpose of the mining
operation. 9 Ellenborough's opinion looked to the implied inten-
tion of the parties to the 1747 agreement.20 He held that it was
reasonable to interpret the deed as intending more than a one-
time grant of rights involving the drainage system, since none
of the specific covenants in the deed negated this intent. 2'
In The Earl of Cardigan v. Armitage,22 access rights were
again determined by implied agreements. The surface owner sued
in trespass when the miner entered the property, dug pits and
removed coal.23 The miner traced his right to a 1649 reservation
of coals and various access rights.24 In determining that the
defendant did have title to the coal, 25 the court observed that
the reservation of the coal also gave as incident "a right ... to
get the coals, and to do all things necessary for the obtaining
the operation of the drainage system, to use stones from Stansfield's ground for the
purpose and to dump rubbish on Stansfield's land. Marshall promised not to damage
the trees on Stansfield's ground, to allow Stansfield inspection of the drainage system
and to repair any damages to Stansfield's fence. Marshall also promised not to remove
any coal from under Stansfield's property other than for that incidentally carried by the
drainage system.
14 Id.
11 Id. at 239.
16 Id.
17 Id.
1 Id. at 240.
,9 Hodgson, 103 Eng. Rep. at 241.
,, Id.
21 Id.
22 107 Eng. Rep. 356 (K.B. 1823).
1 ld. at 357.
24 Id.
I2 d. at 360.
ACCESS AND SURFACE USE
of them." ' 26 This incidental or implied right, however, "would
warrant nothing beyond what was strictly necessary for the
convenient working of the coals."
27
Harris v. Ryding,28 decided in 1839, examined the rights of
support. The mineral owner claimed access rights through a prior
reservation. 29 The access rights were defined within the original
reservation as:
free liberty of ingress, egress, and regress, to come into and
upon the premises, to dig, delve, search for, and get &c., the
said mines and every part thereof, and to sell and dispose of,
take, and convey away the same, at their free will and pleasure;
and also to sink shafts, &c., for the raising up works, carrying
away and disposing of the same or any part thereof, making
a fair compensation to P. for the damage to be done to the
surface of the premises, and the pasture and crops growing
thereon.
30
The miners' activity caused the collapse of the land surface 3'
and the surface owner brought suit in court for the wrongful
and negligent working of the mine. 32 The miner argued that the
miner's use of the land included a right to collapse the surface
and that any harm to the premises was controlled by the "fair
compensation" clause of the reservation.
33
The court held for the surface owner by interpreting the
access agreement as requiring reasonable operation by the miner.
4
One aspect of this reasonable operation was that the surface
would not be undercut by the mining. 35 In the words of Baron
26 Id. at 361 (citing the popular legal treatise, W. SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE OF
COMMON ASSURANCES (1675).
27 Id. at 362. Under this standard, such acts as the deposit of material on the
surface for longer than necessary or the introduction of potential buyers to inspect the
coal were probably forbidden. However, these rights were granted by the express terms
of the 1649 reservation.
151 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. 1839).
2I Id. at 28.
Id. at 27.
3. Id.
32 Id.
11 Id. at 33.
14 Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 33.
35 Id.
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Parke "All that the law gives a grantor by virtue of the excep-
tion, would be a reasonable mode of getting the mines and
minerals .... "36 As in the Hodgson case,37 the court focused on
the intent of the parties to the instrument. 8 Baron Parke viewed
it as "clearly the meaning and intention of the grantor, that the
surface shall be fully and beneficially held and enjoyed by the
grantee." '39 As a consequence, "the [miner] can be entitled
under the reservation only to so much of the mines below as is
consistent with the enjoyment of the surface . . . leaving a
reasonable support to the surface.""4
Thus, the compensation clause did not change the liability
of the miner. 4' The clause applied only to damage resulting from
operations on the surface of the land and was not intended to
bar other remedies. 42 Baron Alderson believed the case could be
decided by the familiar maxim "that he is to use his own
property so as to not do injure his neighbour [sic]." ' 43 While all
of the coal belonged to the miner, it could not be removed by
a means which violated the rights of the surface owner."
The final English case is Dand v. Kingscote5 decided in
1840. The 1630 deed conveyed farm land, but reserved all coal
mines "together with sufficient wayleave and stayleave to and
from the said mines with liberty of sinking and digging pits."46
Two centuries later, the miner used the surface to construct a
railway and various buildings. 47 The surface owner sued in tres-
pass. 48 The miner defended on the language of the reservation
and the implied rights of access accompanying an ownership of
minerals .49
Id. at 30.
11 See, e.g., Hodgson, 103 Eng. Rep. at 241.
18 Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 31.
3" Id.
Qo Id.
" Id. at 32.
42 Id.
43 Id.
- Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 32.
41 151 Eng. Rep. 370 (Ex. 1840).
Id.
41 Id. at 371.
41 Id. at 370.
19 Id. at 371.
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Baron Parke found that the exception of the coal and a right
to dig pits "reserved, all things that are 'depending on that right
and necessary for the obtaining it.' "10 The miner's steam engine,
a pond for supply of the engine, and the engine house were
viewed as necessary accessories. 5 ' Baron Parke returned to the
language of the reservation to determine the propriety of the
railroad.5 2 The intent of the "wayleave and stayleave" reserva-
tion was to allow the coal owner those matters which would be:
reasonably sufficient to enable the coal-owner to get, from
time to time, all the seams of coal to a reasonable profit; and
therefore the owner is not confined to such description of way
as is in use at the time of the grant, and in such a direction
as is then convenient. 3
B. The Early American Cases
In the 1862 case of Cowan v. Hardeman,5 4 the Texas Su-
preme Court noted the "well established doctrine from the ear-
liest days of the common law, that the right to the minerals
[included a right of entry] ... and all other such incidents
thereto as are necessary to be used for getting and enjoying
them." 55 Five subsequent decisions further developed the basic
rules applicable to surface rights in this country.
5 6
One of the earliest American surface access cases is Marvin
v. Brewster Iron Mining Co. 7 The miner justified his elaborate
mining operation by a reservation of mineral ores along with
"the privilege of going to and from all beds of ore that may be
Id. at 379 (citing W. SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE OF COMMON ASSURANCES (1675)).
Dand, 151 Eng. Rep. at 379.
2 /d. at 380.
" Id. While Baron Parke found that most of the railroad construction was appro-
priate within the terms of the reservation, he did sustain a finding that one railroad
spur and certain fences and ditches were unnecessary. Plaintiff was entitled to recover
for these trespasses.
26 Tex. 217 (1862).
Id. at 222 (citing The Queen and The Earl of Northumberland, 75 Eng. Rep.
472 (K.B. 1568); The Earl of Cardigan v. Armitage, 107 Eng. Rep. 356 (K.B. 1823)).
11 Williams v. Gibson, 4 So. 350 (Ala. 1888); Ericson v. Michigan Land & Iron
Co., 16 N.W. 161 (Mich. 1883); Wardell v. Watson, 5 S.W. 605 (Mo. 1887); Marvin v.
Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538 (N.Y. 1874); Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal
Co., 22 A. 1035 (Pa. 1891).
17 55 N.Y. 538 (1874).
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hereafter worked on the most convenient route to and from." '5 8
Plaintiff surface owner sued for injunctive relief and damages.59
He asked the court to forbid land subsidence, waste deposits,
blasting, the operation of a steam engine, and the construction
of various buildings. 60
Engaging in a thorough review of the significant English
cases, the court observed that the miner's right could be drawn
either from an implied incident to a grant or from express
language in the instrument. 6' The rights incident to the grant
were to be judged by a test of "whether or not it was necessary
to be done for the reasonably profitable enjoyment of its prop-
erty in the minerals." ' 62 The express grant in the instrument could
expand or contract the implied grant by its precise words.
63
However, the mere failure to mention certain surface uses in the
specific grant did not forbid them.6
In Ericson v. Michigan Land & Iron Co. ,61 surface owners
brought an ejectment action to terminate iron ore mining. 66 The
miners claimed rights under a deed reservation. 67 The deed re-
served the minerals:
together with the right to enter upon such lands and explore
therefor, and to mine, smelt, and refine such ores and min-
erals, and to quarry and dress such stone or rock, and remove
the same, and for that purpose to erect or construct and main-
tain all such buildings, machinery, roads, or railroads, sink such
shafts, remove such soil, occupy as much of said land, and use
and divert such streams or ponds of water thereon as may be
necessary or convenient for the successful prosecution of such
business.
8
The Michigan Supreme Court's examination of English sur-
face use cases endorsed the proposition that a "mere reservation
I' /d. at 539-40.
I d. at 539.
o Id. at 544.
I d. at 554.
61 Id. at 565.
63 Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 550, 554.
I" d. at 550.
16 N.W. 161 (Mich. 1883).
'~Id.
.7 Id.
" Id. at 161-62.
ACCESS AND SURFACE USE
of minerals . .. must always respect surface rights of support,
and will not, standing alone, permit the surface to be destroyed
without some additional statutory or contract authority, and
that such statute or contract authority will be construed carefully
to prevent the destruction of surface rights." 69 Nevertheless,
"easements to do such acts as are reasonably necessary to get
out the mineral and remove it from the mine may be granted or
reserved so as to attach to the mining estate." 70 On the facts of
the case, the shafts, excavations, and buildings, "used solely for
mining purposes," were proper easements appurtenant to the
mine .
7 '
Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co.72 addressed the miner's
right to the underground space from which coal had been re-
moved. 73 The miner used the underground passages beneath the
surface owner's land to move coal from other properties than
those involved in the original grant. 74 The agreement of the
parties had not expressed a position on the matter 7 and the
surface owner sought an injunction to forbid the use.76 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the coal owner had a
corporeal fee in the coal and that the space from which the coal
was removed should be part of that fee. 77 Nonetheless, the court
found a lack of harm to the surface owner from the miner's use
of the tunnel.
78
Williams v. Gibson79 was another ejectment action brought
by the surface owner to contest excessive use of surface rights.
The reservation through which the mineral claimed provided the
right to:
19 Id. at 163.
70 Id.
7 Ericson, 16 N.W. at 164 (the case was remanded to determine the exact scope
of the reasonable easement).
72 22 A. 1035 (Pa. 1891).
1 See Webber v. Vogel, 42 A. 4, 5 (Pa. 1899) (as long as the mineral grantee is
mining the coal in good faith, the grantee has the right to use the voids for hauling coal
from adjacent lands despite the surface owner's protests).
4 Lillibridge, 22 A. at 1036.
" Id. at 1037.
16 Id. at 1036.
11 Id. at 1037.
7R Id.
"1 4 So. 350 (Ala. 1888).
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all timber and water upon the same, necessary for the devel-
opment, working, and mining of said coal and other minerals,
and the preparation of the same for market, and the removal
of the same; also the right of way and the right to build roads
of a description over the same, necessary for the convenient
transportation of said coal and other minerals from said land,
and the conveying and transporting to and from said land, all
materials and implements that may be of use in the mining
and removal of said coal and other minerals, or in the prep-
aration of the same for market.8 0
The Alabama Supreme Court first concluded that the grant
of minerals was the grant of a "separate corporeal heredita-
ment" distinct from the surface ownership.8 The court further
concluded that: "[tihe express grant of all the minerals or min-
eral rights in a tract of land is, by necessary implication, the
grant also of the right to work them, unless the language of the
grant itself repels this construction. '8 2 This included the right to
penetrate the soil and such reasonably necessary means of re-
moving the minerals "without injury to the support for the
surface or superincumbent soil in its natural state." 3 The precise
issue in the litigation involved the construction of miners' houses
and other outbuildings on the property. 4 The surface owner
argued that the specification of surface rights in the reservation
should exclude any rights not specified therein,8 but the court
rejected this argument, saying that modern inventions could be
used to promote a profitable mining venture.
8 6
In Wardell v. Watson s7 the Missouri Supreme Court dealt
with a similar fact situation. The reservation of minerals included
"the right of mining, and removing at pleasure, coal and other
minerals from under the surface of said land; also, the right and
Io ld. at 351.
Id. at 352.
Id. (citing W. SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE OF COMMON AssuRANCES (1675)).
" Id. at 352.
'" Id. at 353.
Williams, 4 So. at 353.
"' Id. at 354. While the court found that the instrument did not grant any right
to install coking ovens on the mining property, the issue of what would be of necessity
to the mining operation was properly left to the jury.
11 5 S.W. 605 (Mo. 1887).
19851 ACCESS AND SURFACE USE
privilege of sinking, if need be, air-shafts for the purpose of
working, mining, or removing the same." 88  When the miner
sank a shaft and erected a barn and stables, a blacksmith shop,
and a pond, the surface owner brought an ejectment action.
89
The court rejected the surface owner's contention that the reser-
vation of the right to sink an air-shaft excluded any other specific
rights. 90 In the court's view, the implied right "to sink a vertical
shaft, and to do all things reasonably necessary to raise the coals
. . . and to carry them away" was implied as part of the reser-
vation. 91 The express reference to the air-shaft enlarged rather
than restricted the implied powers.
92
C. The Legacy of the Early Surface Rights Cases
Features of English surface access law which were well devel-
oped by 1840, helped American courts define surface rights law.
A review of the early English 93 and American cases 94 illustrate
the state of surface rights law at the start of the 20th century.
By this time, the courts had recognized the concept of the divided
mineral estate, 95 i.e., separate surface and mineral estates can be
created by grant or reservation. 96 Hodgson v. Field97 reflects the
I' ld. at 605.
I ld. at 606.
9I Id. at 607 (citing Armitage, 107 Eng. Reg. at 356).
9, Id. (among other authorities, the court cited W. SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE OF
COMMON ASSURANCES (1675) for implied rights of access and use).
I d.
The English cases examined most of the surface rights issues that have faced
the courts in this century. Litigated issues included access for transportation, facilities
used in connection with the mine, access to additional mineral properties, the responsi-
bility for collapse of land, the need for buildings and other implements to support the
working of the mine and the deposit of mine waste on the surface. From the surface
owner's perspective, these intrusions range from a significant destruction of the surface
estate to minor inconveniences compatible with continued cultivation and residence on
the land. See, e.g., Dand, 151 Eng. Rep. at 370; Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 27; Armitage,
107 Eng. Rep. at 356; Hodgson, 103 Eng. Rep. at 235.
" Williams, 4 So. at 350; Ericson, 16 N.W. at 161; Wardell, 5 S.W. at 605;
Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 538; Lillibridge, 22 A. at 1035.
9' See, e.g., Armitage, 107 Eng. Rep. at 363; Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 548; Lillibridge,
22 A. at 1036.
1 See supra note 95 and cases cited therein.
91 103 Eng. Rep. 238 K.B. (1806).
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court's recognition of the creation of surface rights by an express
agreement. The deed language of the early cases suggests that
conveyancers of the time were attuned to the need to spell out
surface rights in the instrument of grant. 9 The courts were
willing to enforce the terms of the express agreement even when
they went beyond custom, implied grants, or reasonable expec-
tations in the mining industry. 99
The courts also recognized implied rights arising from the
ownership of minerals. I00 The Queen and The Earl of
Northumberland"°' suggested that the mineral owner is entitled
to priority over the surface owner. However, the decisions gen-
erally emphasize necessity and reasonableness; °2 they recog-
nize the considerable economic value of mining activity, yet,
they are solicitous of land use. 03 While the courts generally
discuss the intention of the parties, they are frequently expressing
their sense of what public policy should or should not allow.10
4
The courts do not spend much time on the legal theories on
which the surface rights rest. There are casual mentions of
easements, covenants, or licenses in the opinions, but the courts
rarely elaborate on the precise legal rights involved.
The cases are not helpful in the discussion of remedies. The
actions consistently arise in trespass brought by the surface
owner.'0 5 The landowner concedes that some prior mining agree-
ment existed but argues that it was either no longer in effect or
that it should not be read as broadly as contended by the
miner.106 Plaintiff's remedy, when successful, was some form of
damages. 107
" See cases cited supra notes 93 - 94.
Id.
00o The Queen and The Earl of Northumberland, 75 Eng. Rep. at 510.
I01 Id.
102 See, e.g., Ericson, 16 N.W. at 163; Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 32; Marvin, 55
N.Y. at 565.
0,3 See cases cited supra note 102.
io See Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 31 (assumption of no surface subsidence illustrates
the point, as does the court's precise tailoring of the remedy in Dand, 151 Eng. Rep. at
380).
'0, See, e.g., Armitage, 107 Eng. Rep. at 357; Dand, 151 Eng. Rep. at 370.
,o See, e.g., Hodgson, 103 Eng. Rep. at 240 (surface owner claimed mine operator
had only one-time access right); Ericson, 16 N.W. at 161.
,1 See, e.g., Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 33; Dand, 151 Eng. Rep. at 380.
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II. THE RECURRENT ISSUES IN SURFACE RIGHTS LAW
Hundreds of reported cases since 1900 have expanded on the
foundations of surface rights law. While common themes run
through the cases, they vary considerably depending on the rights
in question. The major recurrent fact patterns in the surface
rights cases will be examined separately before seeking conclu-
sions applicable to all surface rights cases.
A. Access
Of all the rights of the miner, access across the land is
probably the most fundamental.10 8 As numerous courts have
pointed out, access to extract and remove the minerals gives
value to the mineral estate.109 Accordingly, the courts have been
sympathetic to requests from the miner for access."10 In addition
to enforcing express agreements, the courts have allowed a rea-
sonable expansion of the express rights agreed upon by the
parties to include recently developed technologies and provide
for economical mining activity."'
Further, even if no express language in the conveyance dis-
cusses access, courts have viewed access as an implied aspect of
mineral ownership." 2 Several courts have treated access as an
easement appurtenant to the mineral estate," 3 while others have
analogized to the easement of necessity by which a party having
no access to the land is able to gain such access." 4 Occasionally
courts have sought to distinguish "necessary" from "merely
,o The terms "miner" or "mineral owner" will be used interchangeably to designate
the party asserting a claim to use the surface for mineral activity.
,0 Davison v. Reynolds, 103 S.E. 248, 250 (Ga. 1920); Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d
302 (Tex. 1943); Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 853, 854 (W. Va. 1909).
"° Porter, 64 S.E. at 854.
See, e.g., Duncan v. American Standard Asphalt Co., 97 S.W. 392, 393 (Ky.
1906); Grayson v. Lyons, 76 So. 2d 531, 533 (La. 1954); Commonwealth v. Fisher 72
A.2d 568, 570 (Pa. 1950); Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Meadows, 34 S.E.2d 392,
395 (Va. 1945) (citing Williams v. Gibson, 4 So. 350, 353 (Ala. 1888)) (here the English
precedent in Dand v. Kingscote, 151 Eng. Rep. 370, 370 (Ex. 1840) (has carried over to
the United States courts).
1,2 Grayson, 76 So. 2d at 533.
"I Buck Creek R. R. Co. v. Haws, 69 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Ky. 1934); Neal v. Finley,
124 S.W. 348, 349 (Ky. 1910).
'" Melton v. Sneed, 109 P.2d 509, 512 (Okla. 1940).
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convenient" access, denying an implied right for mere conven-
ience."' However, the contemporary position grants reasonable
access but requires the miner to exercise "due regard" for the
surface owner's interest and to avoid any "unnecessary dam-
age."-6
B. Subsidence
A significant portion of surface rights law developed from
the early subsidence cases. A series of English cases from 1850
to 1870"7 provided a framework for subsidence law that was
largely adopted by courts in the United States."' The English
courts took a severe view of land subsidence and made it an
exception to the general rule that the grant of mining rights
included all rights necessary to extract the mineral." 9 For the
most part the courts found it irrelevant that the miner had used
due care or contemporary mining practices in the operation.' 20
If subsidence occurred, there would be liability.' 2' In general,
the courts proceeded either from an implied right of surface
support or from the construction of grants and reservations to
a rule that the miner must provide surface support even at the
cost of losing some of the value of the mining operations. 2 2 An
exception to the rule existed when an express waiver of the right
to support existed.2 3 However, the English courts were reluctant
to find such waivers.1
24
", See Himler Coal v. Kirk, 266 S.W. 355, 357 (Ky. 1924); Friedline v. Hoffman,
115 A. 845, 846 (Pa. 1922).
'" Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976) (an alternative
road path would have been less destructive); Parker v. Texas Co., 326 S.W.2d 579, 579
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
"' Harris v. Ryding, 151 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. 1839); Smart and Spearman v. Morton,
119 Eng. Rep. 393 (K.B. 1855); Roberts v. Haines, 119 Eng. Rep. 1003 (Ex. 1856); Hext
v. Gill, 41 L.J. 761, 767 (1872) (a court can grant injunctive relief to the surface owner
to stop subsidence).
Williams, 4 So. at 353 (citing Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 27).
' Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 27.
, Penman v. Jones, 100 A. 1043, 1045 (Pa. 1917).
Id.
22 Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 53 S.E. 24, 27 (W. Va. 1905).
, Rowbotham v. Wilson, 119 Eng. Rep. 985, 988-89 (K.B. 1856).
, Harris, 151 Eng. Rep. at 27.
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The American subsidence cases compose a significant portion
of the law of surface rights up to the mid-1950's. These cases
generally adopt the English rules that give significant protection
against subsidence to the surface owner. 25 Most courts agree
that a right of surface support exists in the absence of language
in the grant or reservation.' 2 However, the grant or reservation
can expand upon the support right or define the terms under
which it may be used. 127 Most American cases also find negli-
gence or lack of due care irrelevant in defining the support right
unless they are a matter of the contractual agreement. 2 8
Courts have often stated that the miner must have an express
waiver of the right to surface support in order to have a right
to collapse the surface. 29 The cases are divided as to what
constitutes sufficient evidence of a waiver. 30 Typically, a waiver
is claimed based on language that granted the miner the right to
remove "all" coal or relieved him from "any and all claims"
stemming from the operation of the mine.' 3' While most courts
profess to seek the intent of the parties to the agreement,' 3 2 in
practice the courts have considerable flexibility in assessing the
facts of individual cases. Some waivers of support are found in
general language," while other waivers are rejected on minor
technical grounds. 1
3 4
C. Strip Mining
Strip mining has been the most controversial surface rights
issue in recent decades. Strip mining concerns share some fea-
"I Penman, 100 A. at 1046; Charnetski v. Miners Mills Coal Mining, 113 A. 683,
684 (Pa. 1921) (citing Penman). For example, Pennsylvania recognizes the right to support
an estate in land similar to the estates owned by surface and mineral estate owners.
1 Penman, 100 A. at 1043, 1045.
I ld.
28 Mason v. Peabody, 51 N.E.2d 285, 287 (Il. App. Ct. 1943); Berkey v. Berwood-
White Coal Mining, 78 A. 1004, 1007 (Pa. 1911).
129 Piedmont & George's Creek Coal Co. v. Kearney, 79 A. 1013, 1016 (Md. 1911).
Id. at 1016.
Griffin, 53 S.E. at 28; Stilley v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo Co., 83 A. 478, 479-80 (Pa.
1912); Godfrey v. Weyanoke Coal & Coke Co., 97 S.E. 186, 187-88 (W. Va. 1918);
Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke Co., 167 S.E. 737, 737-38 (W. Va. 1933).
32 Griffin, 53 S.E. at 27; Stilley, 83 A. at 480.
'" Simmers, 167 S.E. at 737.
' Hall v. Harvey Coal & Coke, 108 S.E. 491, 493 (W. Va. 1921).
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tures with subsidence. The surface owner has an absolute right
to the support of the surface'35 and such right must be waived
by the surface owner before the miner can strip mine or other-
wise destroy the surface. 3 6 Although a surface owner has ex-
plicitly waived his right to support, the courts may hold that
permission to strip mine was not given. 3 7 The right to strip mine
is not implied from common law rights, but must be given
explicitly or by necessary implication.' 38 While an express grant
to strip mine will be enforced, 3 9 subject to the laws and regu-
lations of the federal, state and local governments, the grants
are often imprecise. t 40
The court will start with the existing language and the cir-
cumstances under which the severance occurred. Language lim-
ited to shaft or underground mining will oppose a finding for
strip mining, 4' while language that gives extensive surface rights
or waives liability for the exercise of surface rights may be
interpreted to show the parties' intent that strip mining be al-
lowed.' 4
2
Courts often consider as controlling the fact that strip mining
was or was not a known method of extraction at the time of
the severance.' 43 If both parties did not know that strip mining
was a prevalent manner of removal, they did not intend that
strip mining be an available option.' 44 One court commented
"I Berkey, 78 A. at 1007; Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 62 S.E.2d 337, 341 (W.
Va. 1950); Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co. 140 S.E. 57, 59 (W. Va. 1927) (the cited
cases applied the absolute right to support in the context of deep mining which other
cases have applied in the context of surface mining).
Berkey, 78 A. at 1007.
'" Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Ky. 1976).
I" d. at 864.
Walker v. Forcey, 151 A.2d 601, 606 (Pa. 1959).
I"0 ld.
"4 Commerce Union Bank, 540 S.W.2d at 864; Rochez Bros. v. Duricak, 97 A.2d
825, 828 (Pa. 1953).
,41 Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co.,Inc., 498 F.2d 1183, 1184-93 (6th Cir. 1974); Croley
v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Ky. 1964); Commonwealth v.
Fitzmartin, 102 A.2d 893, 897 (Pa. 1954).
141 Smith v. Moore, 474 P.2d 794, 795-96 (Colo. 1970); English v. Harris Clay Co.,
35 S.E.2d 329, 331-32 (N.C. 1945); Franklin v. Callicoat, 119 N.E.2d 688, 690 (Ohio
Com. Pl. 1954); Brown v. Crozer Coal & Land Co., 107 S.E.2d 777, 786 (W. Va. 1959).
"4 Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Blackford, 160 N.E.2d 336, 341 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1958); Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 170 A.2d 97, 99-100 (Pa.
1961).
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that strip mining was the only way of extracting the mineral,
and that the parties therefore intended the use of strip mining.
45
Another court has suggested that the compensation paid for the
mineral estate was so great that it, in effect, included payment
for the surface.1'4 This court reasoned that since the amount
paid was in excess of the estimated value of the mineral estate,
the parties must have intended the payment as compensation for
the right to strip mine. 47 Some courts directly balanced the
opposing interests and costs involved.141 One court allowed strip
mining even though it held that the mineral owner had no right
to strip mine. 49 This court held it inequitable to disallow the
only practical method of extraction but granted damages to the
surface owner. 50 Similarly, some courts weighed the relative
value of the estate in determining whether strip mining should
be allowed.''
Aside from the language of severance or the purported intent
of the parties, courts decide cases on the basis of public policy.
5 2
Often the public policy considerations remain unarticulated and
are addressed through court discussions of what is "reasonably
necessary," whether a "reasonable alternative" exists, or what
the parties "intended."'5 The courts generally have based their
decisions on the historical practices of the mineral developers.
5 4
When courts have abandoned past interpretations, they have
done so for the purposes of reflecting a change in public pol-
icy. "'55 A new emphasis is required, and the courts respond by
,, Bridgeview Coal Co. v. Burchinal, 193 A.2d 755, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).
,, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Ky. 1968).
I7 d. at 398.
'4 Barker v. Mintz, 215 P. 534, 535 (Colo. 1923); Franklin, 119 N.E.2d at 694;
Fitzmartin, 102 A.2d at 896-97.
'" Barker, 215 P. at 535.
110 Id. at 535.
Franklin, 119 N.E.2d at 694; Fitzmarlin, 102 A.2d at 896-97.
52 Franklin, 119 N.E.2d at 694; Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist., 170 A.2d at
99-100; Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 620-23. (Tex. 1971).
" See supra note 152.
Dewey v. Great Lakes Coal Co. 84 A. 913, 915 (Pa. 1912) (a mineral owner can
deposit debris at the mouth of the mine shaft because such was the custom and a
contrary result would "startle" the mining community).
"I Getty Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d at 620-23. The accommodation doctrine enunciated
in a non-strip mining context serves as a good example. Until Getty Oil Co., very little
weight was given to the hardships faced by the surface owner-at least overtly. With
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re-interpreting what is "reasonable." 56
D. The Use of Surface Resources
Both the miner and the surface owner may wish to use
natural resources on the property other than the granted mineral.
Most frequently, these debates have involved timber,'5 7 rocks,'58
soil, 5 9 and water. 60 All of these may be useful in the mining
operation, but they may also be of economic benefit to the
surface owner, or the surface owner may simply not wish to see
them used by the miner.
Courts have construed both express grants of the rights to
surface resources' 6' and have implied the right to use them as
part of the miner's ownership of the minerals.t 62 Courts have
often treated the miner's interest as a license for the use of the
resources, making clear that their ownership remained with the
surface user. 63 The miner's use of surface resources has generally
been sustained so long as the use is "directly connected" to the
mining operation. 64 However, the miner's "mere license" may
not give the miner any basis to object to the surface owner's
use of the resources.' 65 Occasional attempts by the miner to
enjoin the surface owner's use have been rejected when the miner
cannot show that the use harms the mining operation. 66 The
increasing concern over the environment, surface owners have received more attention.
I' d.
Wilson v. Smith, 13 Tenn. 379, 408 (1825) (the right of a Tennessee miner to
use timber on the property for smelting operations).
'-' Steinman Dev. Co. v. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832, 839, (W.D. Va. 1922).
- See infra notes 189-93.
-" Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955, 961 (Okla. 1964).
16, Steinman Dev. Co., 290 F. at 837-38; Inland Steel Co. v. lsaacs, 143 S.W.2d
503, 505 (Ky. 1940) (concerning the right to discharge water to an adjacent stream).
161 Prather v. Chevron U.S.A., 563 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (N.D. La. 1983); Dunn v.
Southwest Ardmore Tulip Creek Sand Unit, 548 P.2d 685, 688 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976);
Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Tex. 1972); Stradley v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); cf. Mack Oil Co., 389 P.2d
at 961-62 (pertaining to subterranean water).
161 Steinman Dev. Co., 290 F. at 835; Haughey v. Arnold, 125 S.E. 451 (Ga. 1924);
Sun Lumber Co. v. Nelson Fuel Co., 106 S.E. 41, 44 (W. Va. 1921).
- Sun Lumber Co. 106 S.E. at 44-45 (use of timber to construct houses rather
than to support mine tunnels was found to be outside the permissible use).
'6 Steinman Dev. Co.. 290 F. at 839-40.
161 Id. at 838; Haughey, 125 S.E. at 451.
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courts may also find an obligation on the part of the mining
operation to avoid any unreasonable interference with the sur-
face owner's use of the surface resources. 67
E. Mining Operations on the Surface
The grant of mineral rights justifies the expectation that the
minerals will be extracted and that the extraction will require
some use of the surface. 6 Beyond that, however, there can be
a great variety of operations connected to the mineral develop-
ment. Cases have involved blasting on property, 69 water flood-
ing, 7 0 drilling of wells and shafts,'7 ' and the operation of pumping
stations, 172 tipples, 73 storage tanks, 74 housing, 75 and miners
homes. 7 6 These cases have caused difficulty in determining re-
lations between surface owner and miners. Where the miners
have a clear idea of the operation they anticipate, they have
often spelled out their rights in detail in the agreements.
Courts have been willing to expand the terms of the express
agreement by interpretation to include reasonable additional
uses. 177 Here, the agreement may have mentioned the use, but
may not have been precise as to the exact type of building,
structure, or operation. 7 8 Even without the express grant of use,
miners have been able to assert a variety of implied rights to
operation. One approach is to assert the dominance of the
mineral interest with its implied grants of privileges reasonably
'6 Arkansas Louisiana Gas v. Wood, 403 S.W.2d 54, 56, 57 (Ark. 1966) (improper
to use water in a mining operation that was also necessary for the surface owner's
stockpond).
" See supra notes 55-92 and accompanying text.
' Atherton v. Clearview Coal Co., 110 A. 298 (Pa. 1920).
170 Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718, 721-22 (Ky. 1960).
" Union Prod. Co. v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553 (Miss. 1962).
, Lone Star Prod. Co. v. Jury, 445 P.2d 284 (Okla. 1968).
Tolliver v. Pittsburg Consol. Coal Co., 290 S.W.2d 471, 172 (Ky. 1956).
" Wall v. Shell Oil Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 908 (Cal. 1962).
" Bolen v. Standard Elkhorn Coal Co., 275 S.W. 372 (Ky. 1925).
716 See, e.g., Sun Lumber Co., 106 S.E. at 44-45.
177 Bolen, 275 S.W. at 373 (allowing building of miner's housing on surface);
Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va. 1980) (surface easement for
electrical line for purposes of ventilating coal mine).
,71 Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725.
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necessary for operation.17 9 A second approach is to rely on the
easement of necessity' 80 analogy to contend that without the
surface right in question, the mineral right would be lacking in
value.
Courts have adopted these theories, but have restricted them
with standards of reasonableness and attention to the burden on
the landowner.'' Where the use appears reasonably necessary
and the burden on the surface owner is not harsh, the court will
allow it as an implied use. 8 ' By contrast, where the use goes
well beyond the necessities of the mining operation, or where it
imposes a significant burden on the landowner, the use will be
denied.8 3 Among the uses determined to be unreasonable have
been the location of well sites on the exact spot of the surface
owner's retirement home'8 or within three feet of his ensilage
pit.185 The cases often require the mine owner to seek injunctive
relief from the court to prevent the surface owner from stopping
his mining operations.
8 6
F. Pollution of the Surface
Mining operations may either consciously use the surface
estate for the deposit of waste or pollute the surface inadvert-
ently in the course of mining.8 7 The other pollution cases have
119 Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980); Flying Diamond Corp. v.
Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976) (the Dominance Doctrine was asserted here but the
court found it was not applicable when there is a reasonable and practical alternative
available which minimizes damage to the surface).
' Baker v. Pittsburgh C&W Ry., 68 A. 1014, 1015-16 (Pa. 1908) (citing 2 LINDLEY
ON MINES § 813 (2d ed. 1903)).
'' Ball, 602 S.W.2d at 523; Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., Inc., 501 S.W.2d
865, 867 (Tex. 1973); Sun Oil Co., 483 S.W.2d at 810.
"I Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Williams, i0 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Ky. 1928); Lone
Star Prod., 445 P.2d at 287; Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725-26; Squires v.
Lafferty, 121 S.E. 90, 91 (W. Va. 1924).
'$3 Wiser Oil Co., 346 S.W.2d at 721-22 (the court found that even though the water
flooding method of oil recovery was necessary it could not be utilized since it would destroy
the surface); Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 160, 163-64 (Ark. 1974).
" Diamond Shamrock, 511 S.W.2d at 163.
' Reeding & Bates Offshore Drilling Co. v. Jergensen, 453 S.W.2d 853, 855-56
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
Bolen, 275 S.W. at 372; Squires, 121 S.E. at 90.
"' See infra notes 189-99 and accompanying text.
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involved the piling of mining debris on the surface' 8 and the
pollution of water because of mining activities. 8 9 The water
pollution cases have dealt with pollution of streams,' 9° injuries
to livestock from salt water '9' and spillover from saltwater or
slush pits.192
The cases have recognized express agreements regarding pol-
lution rights' 93 and have also recognized implied rights to pollute
either from custom allowing the polluting activity,194 or as a part
of the necessary or reasonable use of the mined property. 95 The
more recent cases reflect a greater sensitivity to surface damage.
While these cases recognize the miner's interest, they require
"due regard" for the surface interest,' 96 and lack of such may
lead to a finding of negligent or otherwise tortious conduct by
the miner. 97 Increasingly, mining pollution has become the sub-
ject of statute and regulation which may supplant or alter com-
mon law understandings. 98
-8 Himrod v. Ft. Pitt Mine & Mill Co., 238 F. 746, 747 (8th Cir. 1916); Phillips
v. Sipsey Coal Mining Co., 118 So. 513, 534 (Ala. 1928); Dewey, 84 A. at 915.
"' Nebo Consol. Coal & Coking Co. v. Lynch, 133 S.W. 763, 764 (Ky. 1911) (rain
washing mine tailings into a stream thereby polluting it held to be a nuisance); Oakwood
Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Meadows, 34 S.E.2d 392, 393 (Va. 1945) (pollution of a
spring).
,9 See supra note 189.
- Robinson v. South Penn Oil Co., 163 S.E. 857, 857 (W. Va. 1932).
,92 Charles F. Hayes & Assocs. v. Blue, 233 So. 2d 127, 128 (Miss. 1970); Central
Oil Co. v. Shows, 149 So. 2d 306, 308-11, (Miss. 1963); Gulf Refining Co. v. Davis, 80
So. 2d 467, 468 (Miss. 1955).
,91 Goodson v. Comet Coal Co., 31 S.W.2d 293, 294-95 (Ark. 1930) (supplemental
lease allowed dumping of debris from adjacent mines on surface); United Carbon Co.
v. Webb, 137 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Ky. 1940) (express right to dump, store and leave "much"
on surface and right to pollute watercourses granted in lease agreement).
'1 Dewey, 84 A. at 914-15 (implied right to dump "gob" on surface near mouth
of mine); Robinson, 163 S.E. at 857 (salt water pollution of surface allowed when it
was result of "only practicable method known" to separate oil and salt water).
, Himrod, 238 F. at 748-49 (not error to instruct jury that mining company was
not liable if it was necessary to dump waste material on surface lands) (emphasis added).
'1 See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Press Eversole, 253 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Ky. 1952);
Charles Hayes & Assocs., 233 So. 2d at 128 (citing Placid Oil Co. v. Byrd, 127 So. 2d
17 (Miss. 1968)).
,9 Blue Diamond Coal Co., 253 S.W.2d at 582 (the "due regard" concept would
not allow the deposit of debris from many properties on one surface parcel).
198 See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 [hereinafter
cited as SMCRA], Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(1982)); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 350.060(5)(h), 353.150, 353.160, 353.550 (1983).
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G. Use of the Surface to Benefit Mining on Other Property
One of the most litigated surface rights issues has involved
the other mining property.'99 "Other property" controversies
have dealt with surface transport, 200 use of underground tunnels
for shipping minerals from other properties, 20' the deposit of
debris from other properties on the surface, 20 2 and the use of
buildings, shafts, and processing facilities on the surface to
benefit extraction from other parcels. 203 Typically, the surface
owner and mineral owner have reached agreement on the use of
their shared property. The mineral owner, in addition to the
minerals, has received some or all of the surface rights described
in earlier sections. A different question arises, however, when
the miner is also working contiguous mineral properties. 2°4 The
miner believes that his venture on the contiguous property would
be aided by the use of the surface. The surface owner resists the
added burden brought on the surface or wishes to receive some
share of the benefit to the mineral owner.
The courts have not recognized implied rights in the miner
to use the surface to benefit mining on other property. 20 1 While
the earlier cases show some sympathy for the miner, 2°6 the con-
temporary position is that the mineral owner is not entitled to
use the surface for the benefit of other mineral ventures without
express permission. 20 7 The cases turn on the interpretation of the
- See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
See Hi Hat Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Kelly, 205 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Ky. 1962);
Tutwiler v. Etheridge, 231 So. 2d 93 (Ala. 1970); Sherwood v. Greater Mammoth Vein
Coal Co., 185 N.W. 279 (Iowa 1921); Gumbert v. McCracken, 18 A. 1068 (Pa. 1890).
-' See Smith v. Wright, 424 P.2d 384 (Colo. 1967); Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal
Co., 22 A. 1035 (Pa. 1891); Kormuth v. United Stated Street Co., 108 A.2d 907 (Pa.
1954); Clayburn v. Camila Red Ash Coal Co., 105 S.E. 117 (Va. 1920).
12 See Newman v. Hi Hat Elkhorn Coal Co., 298 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1962); Phillips,
118 So. at 534.
'" See Ross Coal Co. v. Cole, 249 F.2d 600 (4th Cir. 1957); Bagley v. Republic
Iron & Steel Co., 69 So. 17 (Ala. 1915); Marlowe v. Mascum, 171 S.W.2d 997 (Ky.
1943); Miles v. Home Gas Co., 316 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
See Ross Coal Co., 249 F.2d at 600.
I ld. at 605.
See Gumbert, 18 A. at 1069; Lillibridge, 22 A. at 1039; Moore v. Indian Camp
Coal Co., 80 N.E. 6 (Ohio 1907).
' See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Smith, 471 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1973); Ross
Coal Co., 249 F.2d at 604-05; Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636, 642-43 (9th Cir.
1956); Rose v. Martin, 220 S.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Ky. 1949); Camila Red Ash Coal Co.,
105 S.E. at 122; Phillips, 118 So. at 533-34; Tutwiler, 231 So. 2d at 93.
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agreement. 201 The surface owner contends the agreement does
not authorize the benefit to adjacent properties, while the miner
contends to the contrary. Courts have sustained the claims of
miners where the language expressly preserves rights involving
other properties or gives indication of such claim."° However,
courts have strictly interpreted grants to prevent the miner from
claiming rights on other properties.1 ° On other occasions, courts
have interpreted agreements to forbid the use of other prop-
erty.
2 1 1
III. THE STRANDS OF SURFACE RIGHTS LAW
The law of surface rights has evolved both as a distinctive
whole and as a collection of separate responses to the varied
needs of miners and surface owners. Courts assess subsidence
differently from operations on the surface or requests to use the
surface for mining activity on other lands. The genius of the
common law has been in its ability to borrow doctrines from
established law and to create new law as the needs of mining
and surface preservation demanded. 21 2 As a result, contemporary
surface rights law contains strains of property, contract, and
tort doctrines. Were this not enough, the activity of government
in recent decades has added a heavy public regulatory component
to surface rights law.
A. The Property Law Contribution
Property doctrines have played a major role in surface rights
law.2"3 As has been noted, a valuable contribution of the English
See Ross Coal Co., 249 F.2d at 604-06.
209 See Potter v. Rend, 50 A. 821, 822 (Pa. 1902); Sherwood, 185 N.W. at 283; Fisher
v. West Virginia Coal & Transp. Co., 108 A.2d 907, 909 (Pa. 1954); Smith, 424 P.2d at 384.
Co., 108 A.2d 907, 909 (Pa. 1954); Smith, 424 P.2d at 384.
210 See Reliance Coal & Coke Co. v. Kentucky Coal & Coke Co., 23 S.W. 1095
(Tenn. 1893); Hi Hat Elkhorn Coal Co., 298 F.2d at 120 (the grant of the right to use
other property for certain purposes may not include the right to make use of it for
related purposes).
- See Vogel v. Webber, 28 A. 226 (Pa. 1893); Dietz v. Mission Transfer Co., 25
P. 423 (Cal. 1890); Moore v. Price, 101 N.W. 91 (Iowa 1904).
112 See infra notes 213-27.
23 See generally 4 D. VISH, COAL LAW AND REGULATION § 80.01[l] (1984).
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courts, carried over by the first American decisions, was the
recognition of the separate mineral estate in land and the devel-
opment of the mineral lease. 214 These developments gave worth
to mineral ownership and provided the basis for exploitation of
mineral wealth. 215 They also allowed the exploitation of both
surface and mineral values on the same parcel of land, which
was surely an economically efficient use of scarce resources.
Once the independent property interest in the mineral estate
was recognized, property law concepts helped define the surface
rights that would accompany the ownership of minerals. 21 6 Com-
mon law property rights developed in non-mining situations
proved useful to the mining surface rights cases. The most promi-
nent of these rights were the easement and the license.2 17 The
former was recognized to provide the miner access to the mineral
deposit site and to assure a way of removing the extracted
material for further processing en route to market. 218 Surface
rights cases have recognized express and implied easements2 9 as
well as easements by necessity. 20 Courts have also been willing
to expand the terms of easements to promote commercial devel-
opment of the mining enterprise.
22'
The license, or profit, has been useful in defining the miner's
right to make use of surface resources-timber, stones, water,
etc.-in the mining venture. The cases have ordinarily recognized
the miner's right of use. 222 Surface owners may retain the right
to use certain minerals for domestic purposes. 223 One concern in
214 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
215 See id.
2,6 See VIsH, supra, note 213, § 80.01[1].
, Id. § 83.03[1l.
2I8 Id. § 83.03[5].
2,9 See Yates v. Gulf Oil Corp., 182 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1950); Phelps v. Fitch, 255
S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1953); Lester Coal Corp. v. Lester, 122 S.E.2d 901 (Va. 1961).
220 See Buck Creek R.R. Co. v. Haws, 69 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Ky. 1934); Neal v.
Finley, 124 S.W. 348, 349 (Ky. 1910); see also Melton v. Sneed, 109 P.2d 509 (Okla.
1940). But see Greek v. Wylie, 109 A. 529 (Pa. 1920) (rejecting easement by necessity on
facts).
22' See Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co., 91 S.E. 391, 393 (W. Va. 1917); Buffalo
Mineral Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 723-25 (W. Va. 1980).
2 See Steinman Dev. Co. v. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832 (W.D. Va. 1922);
Haughey v. Arnold, 125 S.E. 451 (Ga. 1924); Sun Lumber Co. v. Nelson Fuel Co., 106
S.E. 41, 44-45 (W. Va. 1921).
22 See Patrick v. Allen, 350 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. 1961); Lyons v. Gambill, 47 S.W.2d
532 (Ky. 1932).
ACCESS AND SURFACE USE
the license cases is whether the rights may be limited to the
parties reaching the agreement and not to their successors.
224
Property law has created a more comprehensive view of
surface rights through the implied rights doctrine. This doctrine
holds the ownership of minerals carries with it the right to use
the surface in order to explore for and extract the minerals at a
profit. 225 The cases have not been precise about the legal pedigree
of such a right. Usually, the right is phrased as an "incident"
of the mineral estate. 226 The cases also have varied as to the
degree of necessity which the miner must show and the closeness
of connection between the mining operation and the surface use
that must be present.
2 7
B. The Contract Law Contribution
The creation of distinct estates in the same parcel of land at
the same time forced the law to recognize that the miner and
surface owner would have to live with each other's uses of the
property. 2  A benefit in allowing them to tailor the living arrange-
ments to fit their particular needs also was recognized. 29 In many
instances, such flexibility was essential to entering into split estate
arrangments.230 Accordingly, the law recognized the right of the
parties to vary the standard property assumptions regarding sur-
face use.
231
The property law doctrines of covenants and equitable ser-
vitudes introduced the concept of promises between the parties
to surface rights agreements.23 2 The agreements bound subse-
quent takers of the interests233 and also offered the flexibility
that the two parties needed. Contractual rules were employed to
:14 Lyons, 47 S.W.2d at 534.
11 4 D. VISH, supra note 213, § 81.0112].
226 Id
227 See supra note 115.
228 Id.
I' d.
230 For example, if the grant of mineral rights automatically passed the right to use
timber on the property for mining purposes, a surface owner wanting to perserve his
trees might not enter into any transfer of mining rights.
23 See supra note 115.
232 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539 (1944).
233 Id.
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resolve disputed cases. The central objective of the courts was
to carry out the intent of the parties. 23 4 Where language was
unambiguous, the courts recognized that the agreement of the parties
would override contract presumptions of surface rights law.
235
However, difficulties in interpretation arise when the miner makes
an unexpected demand on the surface or wishes to use a new
technology that is not precisely defined in the instrument.
23 6
Then, a search for the intention of the parties may be pointless.
Close reading of certain cases suggests the court is often
faced with finding an intention that was not present at the time
of an agreement. 23 7 Courts then rely on such doctrines as con-
struing against the drafter238 or inferring the expectations of the
parties at the time of drafting. 23 9 Alternatively, a court may fall
back on the property rules that define rights in the absence of
an express agreement of the parties.24°
C. The Tort Law Contribution
Tort law has also contributed to surface rights law. The
intrusive nature of many mining activities on surface values
shows the potential of the tort action. A venerable portion of
tort law addresses injury to land. Doctrines of trespass and
nuisance protect, respectively, the interests in possession and use
and enjoyment of property. 241 The negligence action and the
2, See Mason v. Peabody, 51 N.E.2d 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943); Piedmont & George's
Creek Coal Co. v. Kearney, 79 A. 1013 (Md. 1911); Stilley v. Pittsburg-Buffalo Co., 83
A. 478 (Pa. 1912); Godfrey v. Weyanoke Coal & Coke Co., 97 S.E. 186 (W. Va. 1918);
Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke Co., 167 S.E. 737 (W. Va. 1933); see also Griffin v.
Fairmont Coal, 53 S.E. 24, 30 (W. Va. 1905). Thus, a surface owner could consent to
the collapse of his property or to the use of a roadway across his land for the movement
of coal from another property. So, too, a miner might relinquish his otherwise existing
"right" to use surface resources in the mining operation or to dump debris on the
surface.
23 See supra note 234.
23 See infra notes 238-39.
237 Id.
11, Compass Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n, 454 A.2d 1167, 1169 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1983).
119 See Bridgeview Coal Co. v. Burchinal, 193 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963);
Gumbert v. McCracken, 18 A. 1068 (Pa. 1890); Oresta v. Romano Bros., 73 S.E.2d
622, 627 (W. Va. 1952).
See supra note 239.
1" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D comment e (1979).
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strict liability claim may also be appropriate in surface damage
cases .242
The tort causes of action have often served as the means to
raise a surface rights issue. The trespass action focuses on the
surface owner's claim that his property interest has been harmed
when a miner goes beyond the privileges of his estate.2 43 Where
the miner is found to have privileges in the surface estate as a
part of his mining rights, the issue shifts to the care or intent
with which the miner engaged in the activity. 44 Furthermore,
cases frequently recognize the miner's rights to use the surface
up to the point where the use is negligent, malicious, or wan-
ton.
24 5
The tort concepts of "reasonableness" and "balancing" in-
creasingly are used to adjust surface rights controversies.46
The common formulation is that while the miner has the right
to make use of the surface for the benefit of the mining oper-
ation, he must exercise those rights with "due regard" for the
interests of the surface owner and insure that "no unnecessary
damage" occurs to the surface estate. 247 The cases also reflect a
use of the balancing of interests developed in nuisance law.
Courts will assess (1) the harms rendered to the surface, 24 (2) the
benefits conveyed to the miner, 249 and (3) the cost of alternatives
to the mining practice.
20
Two recent prominent surface rights cases utilized a tort
analysis. First, in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones251 the court required
the mineral owner to consider the impact of surface use on the
, Id. §§ 817-821.
Z,3 See infra note 245.
SId.
2, See Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968); Blue
Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960); United Carbon Co. v. Webb,
137 S.W.2d 733 (Ky. 1940); Gulf Refining Co. v. Davis, 80 So. 2d 467 (Miss. 1955).
, See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Eversole, 253 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1952); Inland
Steel Co. v. Isaacs, 143 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1940); Parker v. Texas Co., 326 S.W.2d 579
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Speedman Oil Co. v. Duval County Ranch Co., 504 S.W.2d
923, 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
I' ld. §§ 817-821.
See Inland Steel, 143 S.W.2d at 505.
2 See Blue Diamond Coal Co., 253 S.W.2d at 582.
o See infra note 257.
5- 470 S.W.2d. 618 (Tex. 1971).
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surface estate. 252 In Getty Oil Co., the surface owner wanted the
oil and gas lessee to place its pumping units in concrete cellars
so that the units would not interfere with an irrigation system.
253
The irrigation system could clear objects under seven feet in
height; however, two of the lessee's pumping units were over
seven feet high.254 Placement of the units in the cellars would
allow the system to move freely.255 The court held that the lessee
should remove the units that interfered with the irrigation sys-
tem, and suggested that the lessee place them in the cellars.
256
The court reasoned that since the lessee's use of the surface
worked a hardship on the surface owner, the lessee should desist
because reasonable alternatives were available. 257 The court stated
that:
if the manner of use selected by the dominant mineral lessee
is the only reasonable, usual and customary method that is
available for developing and producing the minerals on this
particular land then the owner of the servient estate must yield.
However, if there are other usual, customary and reasonable
methods practiced in the industry on similar lands put to
similar uses which would not interfere with the existing uses
being made by the servient surface owner, it would be unrea-
sonable for the lessee to employ an interfering method or
manner of use.
25
8
Second, in Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust,2 9 the Court fol-
lowed the accommodation doctrine of Getty Oil Co. 260 It held
that the oil and gas lessee was liable for construction of an
access road when an alternative route suggested by the surface
owner would have minimized the damage. 26' The court stated
that:
2 Id. at 621.
2I Id. at 620-22.
2 , Id. at 620.
235 Id.
2- Id. at 623.
z17 470 S.W.2d at 628.
$ Id.
119 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976).
Id. at 511.
Id. at 511-12.
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[w]herever there exist separate ownerships of interests in the
same land, each should have the right to use and enjoyment
of his interest in the property to the highest degree possible
not inconsistent with the rights of the other. We do not mean
to be understood as saying that such a lessee must use any
possible alternative. But he is obliged to pursue one which is
reasonable and practical under the circumstances.
262
D. Remedies for Deprivation of Rights
The variety of factual situations in the surface rights area
suggests the need for a variety of remedies for alleged interfer-
ence with surface rights. Property, contract, and tort law provide
a considerable number of remedial actions. In general, the re-
medial actions may be classified as (1) actions to define the
rights of title, (2) requests for monetary damages, and
(3) requests for injunctive relief.
The title action cases include actions for ejectment, 263 quiet
title, 26 and reformation. 265 Occasionally these actions appear in
the form of declaratory judgments. 26 Typically, the plaintiff
seeks to clarify his ownership of some "incident" of the surface
rights.
The monetary relief cases are actions in trespass, 26' ac-
tions for waste, 268 and actions based on negligence, 269 nuis-
2 Id. at 511.
See Dietz v. Mission Transfer Co., 25 P. 423 (Cal. 1890); Walker v. Forcey,
151 A.2d 601 (Pa. 1959).
See Miller v. Ridgley, 117 N.E.2d 759 (Ill. 1954); Colonial Royalties Co. v.
Keener, 266 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1953); Mellon, 109 P.2d at 509; Yaquina Bay Timber &
Logging Co. v. Shiny Rock Mining Corp., 556 P.2d 672 (Ore. 1976); Campbell v.
Schrock, 10 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
6I Stokes v. Tutvet, 328 P.2d 1096 (Mont. 1958).
2" See Peabody Coal v. Erwin Co., 453 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1971); Commerce Union
Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1976); Bridgeview Coal Co., 193 A.2d at 755.
267 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Tutwiler
v. Etheredge, 231 So. 2d 93 (Ala. 1970); Rose v. Martin, 220 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1949);
Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1979); Coxe v. Lehigh Valley Ry.
Co., 158 A.2d 782 (Pa. 1960); Dewey v. Great Lakes Coal Co., 84 A. 913 (Pa. 1912);
Collier v. Caraway, 140 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
Wilson v. Smith, 13 Tenn. 379, 408-09 (1825).
See Justice v. Pennzoil Co., 598 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1979); Central Oil Co. v.
Shows, 149 So. 2d 306 (Miss. 1963); Gulf Refining Co., 80 So. 2d at 467; Atherton v.
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ance, 270 intentional wrongdoing, 27' or strict liability.2
72 In these
situations the harmful action has already occurred and the
plaintiff, usually the surface owner, is seeking recompense for
the damage.
The injunctive relief cases seek to prevent or mitigate threat-
ened damage. Since the English courts first recognized the pro-
priety of injunctive relief to enforce surface rights, 73 the courts
have been receptive to requests for injunctions from both surface
owners and miners. The surface owners typically seek to prevent
destructive uses of the property which they contend are not
within the rights of the mineral owner. 274 The miners' resort to
injunctive relief typically has been asserted in the face of a
surface owner attempts to block mining activity.
2 75
Conclusion
This article has examined the factual situations and legal
theories that have created the common law of surface rights in
mining. Both the legal instruments and the courts interpreting
them have recognized that the relationship between the surface
owner and the miner must consider the needs of both parties. Ac-
cordingly, a law evolved that gives primacy to mineral deeds,
recognizes the right of the parties to define arrangements to their
Clearview Coal Co., 110 A. 298 (Pa. 1920); Pennsylvania Cent. Brewing Co. v. Lehigh
Valley Coal Co., 95 A. 471 (Pa. 1915); Texaco, Inc. v. Spires, 435 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1968).
270 Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1974); Charles
Hayes & Assoc. Inc. v. Blue, 233 So. 2d 127 (Miss. 1970).
271 Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 403 S.W.2d 54 (Ark. 1966); Speedman
oil Co., 504 S.W.2d at 923.
'7' Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 51 N.E.2d 285 (Il1. Ct. App. 1943); Berkey v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 78 A. 1004 (Pa. 1911).
.. Roberts v. Haines, 119 Eng. Rep. 1003, 1007 (Ex. 1856) (dicta); Hext v. Gill, 41
L.J.Ch. 761, 767 (1872).
21, Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538 (1874); Ryckman v. Gillis,
57 N.Y. 68 (1874); Shawlis v. Quemahoning Creek Coal Co., 105 A. 826 (Pa. 1919);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Getty Oil Co. v.
Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971); Speedman Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d at 923.
27 Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp., 313 S.W.2d 839 (Ark. 1958); Davison v.
Reynolds, 103 S.E. 248 (Ga. 1920); Bolin v. Standard Elkhorn Coal Co., 275 S.E. 372
(Ky. 1925); Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1980); Parker v. Texas Co., 326
S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Squires v. Lafferty, 121 S.E. 90 (W. Va. 1924);
Porter v. Machine Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 853 (W. Va. 1909).
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own needs and forces the miner to be attentive to legitimate claims
of the surface owner.
The accommodations of the common law provide a sensible
pattern for the structuring of affairs between private parties.
Energy law in the last third of the 20th century has added a
public component to the common law doctrines. The government
involves itself in surface rights matters as the owner of one or
both of the estates. Even when government does not act as
landowner it may enforce regulatory preferences of the public
against the desires of the miner and surface owner. Thus, the
rights of mineral ownership may no longer include the ability to
strip mine or deposit waste products on the surface. In summary,
while the common law precedents provide guidance in evaluating
contemporary surface rights disputes, they are only a part of a
complex and evolving legal structure.

